Moosemouse
I can imagine a containerized service that only runs, say, ssh which only runs a forcedcommand, like Borgbackup
And set up the container with the storage-opt option to limit space usage. It would make it harder to misuse the space or cpu, or break out into the hosting server.
You could go one step further and set up something like a tailscale/headscale network and only allow access over that, and limit the acls on the tailnet to only the ssh port. That should shield it from the Internet at large and also apple am absolute minimum of access to the other side.
I wonder if you could run the tailscale client within the container? Having it all together would make it actually usable.
I’m also looking at some of the distributed file systems out there, if one supports “m of n” connections to get the data, you could possibly use that to have the encrypted backups stored on multiple machines at once with more resilience.
I can imagine a containerized service that only runs, say, ssh which only runs a forcedcommand, like Borgbackup
And set up the container with the storage-opt option to limit space usage. It would make it harder to misuse the space or cpu, or break out into the hosting server.
You could go one step further and set up something like a tailscale/headscale network and only allow access over that, and limit the acls on the tailnet to only the ssh port. That should shield it from the Internet at large and also apple am absolute minimum of access to the other side.
I wonder if you could run the tailscale client within the container? Having it all together would make it actually usable.
I’m also looking at some of the distributed file systems out there, if one supports “m of n” connections to get the data, you could possibly use that to have the encrypted backups stored on multiple machines at once with more resilience.
I can imagine a containerized service that only runs, say, ssh which only runs a forcedcommand, like https://borgbackup.readthedocs.io/en/stable/usage/serve.html
And set up the container with the storage-opt option to limit space usage. It would make it harder to misuse the space or cpu, or break out into the hosting server.
You could go one step further and set up something like a tailscale/headscale network and only allow access over that, and limit the acls on the tailnet to only the ssh port. That should shield it from the Internet at large and also apple am absolute minimum of access to the other side.
I wonder if you could run the tailscale client within the container? Having it all together would make it actually usable.
I’m also looking at some of the distributed file systems out there, if one supports “m of n” connections to get the data, you could possibly use that to have the encrypted backups stored on multiple machines at once with more resilience.
It would be marginally risky, but considering how many people have large storage arrays having a “mutual backup compact” between two folks where each can run backups to the others array would help get you an affordable offsite backup for catastrophes.
I see a bunch of people with 10TB of data and 30TB arrays and if two of them got together they would both be reasonably safe from a total array failure.
You could look into AWS Glacier or S3 Deep Storage tier. If you have 20TB stored that’s about $20/month(YMMV) which isn’t wonderful but that’s a lot of data so it’s understandable.
Being a cheapskate, if I can get something back or it’s not crucial it’s on a RAID array with snapshots, everything else is either encrypted Duplicati backups to Google Drive (Windows) or encrypted borg backups to Borgbase(Linux)
Borgbase is very reasonably priced and if you have a large storage space in GDrive due to having one of their other services it’s a good use of it.
As a security “expert” by trade, Hello’s PIN garbage always frustrates me. Do you honestly think someone is going to put different PINs on different devices? I get the whole “don’t let the password leave the machine” but EVEN MICROSOFT solved that with Kerberos long ago. It’s a solution for a solved problem.
None of the “benefits” seemed to line up. The multifactor/biometric support is in theory good, at least, but the rest of the copy they give users is useless.
Use good, unique passphrases on a few things (your computer, your phone, and your password manager) and use randomly generated passwords for everything else.
I can imagine a containerized service that only runs, say, ssh which only runs a forcedcommand, like Borgbackup
And set up the container with the storage-opt option to limit space usage. It would make it harder to misuse the space or cpu, or break out into the hosting server.
You could go one step further and set up something like a tailscale/headscale network and only allow access over that, and limit the acls on the tailnet to only the ssh port. That should shield it from the Internet at large and also apple am absolute minimum of access to the other side.
I wonder if you could run the tailscale client within the container? Having it all together would make it actually usable.
I’m also looking at some of the distributed file systems out there, if one supports “m of n” connections to get the data, you could possibly use that to have the encrypted backups stored on multiple machines at once with more resilience.