Fanatics usually act in a state of passion, unprofessionally, and always in one direction. They usually do not leave the area of the terrorist attack, but kill as many people as possible until they are eliminated by security forces. Here we see a planned action: the group arrived, organized and cold-blooded, not in a hurry (this is the key point), shot as many people as possible and also organized and not in a hurry went away by car to a certain point of turnout, where they were already taken.
All this indicates that someone gave them certain guarantees. The first version is based on this. Here it is:
Special services usually supervise and shepherd all radical groups, ultra-left, ultra-right, Islamists, other religious fanatics, etc. These groups are not touched until they cross a certain line marked by the services. This is a big and interesting topic in general, but not about it now. In general, the cell of IS terrorists (or rather their sympathizers) was supervised by one of the FSB contactors. This explains why Western intelligence found out about it: because such chains are usually visible to specialists from the agency. The IS sympathizers, meanwhile, of course don't know it's an FSB officer and are sure it's one of the confidantes. Again, this is a classic theme applied not only in the Russian Federation; this is how all intelligence services operate.
Further, I simplify the scheme as much as possible for clarity: a cell of sympathizers (the IS sends sympathizers, as a rule, not its own members on such tasks) is planning to commit a terrorist act (the reason, for example, is revenge), but expects goodwill from the contactors. The handler, who is connected with Russian agents, gives such permission, adding that the law enforcers will be busy in such squares, far from the theater of the incident, and you have one hour, plus he gives them the location of the conspiratorial turnout.
This scenario explains a lot of things: why they worked in no hurry, organized came and went, realizing that no one would come for their souls, and drove to a certain point, where they were caught. But this scenario has some flaws, which I will not voice, but I will emphasize once again that this is one of the possible scenarios. Then I present the second one, it is simpler, but no less curious.
These Tajiks, who are sympathizers of IS terrorists, were forcibly recruited by the Russian Ministry of Defense for the war against Ukraine, as it has been done for years with migrants: people are forced to sign a contract or lured by deception, saying that you will only dig there/we will give you citizenship and so on. Then, these IS sympathizers, having received basic combat training in Russian camps, simply decide not to go to the front, but to go and shoot people. Such situations have already happened in Russia, when migrants, again Tajiks by the way, also forcibly and fraudulently recruited, shot some soldiers and officers at one of the Russian military bases. This is a similar situation, but this time the types turned out to be a little, so to speak, politically engaged, and decided not to shoot at the base, but to go to kill civilians at once, again, on the tip-off of their handlers (the real ones, the IS).
This second version looks good, but it doesn't explain why they took their time and organized themselves. Again I bring you back to the beginning of my thread: everything points to the fact that they had certain guarantees, and the complete inaction of Russian security forces in the first hour of the attack fully confirms this. Seems key to me.
@yigal_levin
По поводу теракта в Москве вырисовываются две основные версии, основанные, в том числе, и на поведении стрелков. https://casbt1osint.blogspot.com/2024/03/are-two-main-versions-of-terrorist.html?utm_source=pocket_saves
Analysis of the terrorist attack in Moscow: Two Versions.
There are two main versions of the Moscow terrorist attack based, among other things, on the behavior of the shooters. Fanatics usually act in a state of passion, not professionally and always in one direction. They usually do not leave the scene of the attack, but kill as many people as possible until they are eliminated by security. Here we see a planned action: the group arrived, organized themselves, and in cold blood, without rushing (this is the key point), shot as many people as possible, and also organized and without rushing went by car to a certain meeting point, where they were already taken away.
All this suggests that someone provided them with certain guarantees. The first version is based on this. Here it is:
The intelligence services usually control and lead all radical groups, the far left, far right, Islamists, other religious fanatics, etc. These groups are not touched until they cross a certain line marked by the services. This is a big and interesting topic in general, but that's not what we're talking about here. In general, the cell of ISIS terrorists (or rather their supporters) was under the supervision of one of the FSB contractors. This explains why Western intelligence learned about it: because such chains are usually visible to agency specialists. IS sympathizers, meanwhile, of course, do not know that it is an FSB officer and are sure that it is one of their confidants. Again, this is a classic theme that applies not only to the Russian Federation; this is how all intelligence services work.
Next, I've simplified the scheme as much as possible for clarity: a cell of sympathizers (IS sends sympathizers, usually not its own members, on such missions) plans to commit a terrorist attack (the reason, for example, is revenge), but expects goodwill from the contractors. The guardian, who is connected to Russian agents, gives such permission, adding that law enforcement will be busy in such areas, far from the scene, and you.