Interesting Global News

My initial take: this article seems really poor. Oversimplifying the KMT as being "pro-Beijing" is pretty typical of non-Taiwanese media talking about Taiwan, but calling the TPP their allies is very strange and seems aimed at pushing a very specific narrative.

But its biggest sin is that it reports basically nothing about the facts behind this issue. Wtf is the bill in question going to do?

make it more difficult for voters to oust elected officials who they see as unfit.

This tells me basically nothing. Something about making recalls stricter, I guess.

Personally, I don't like recalls as a general rule. It's called an election. But in extreme cases it's probably handy to have a way to get rid of representatives early. So if you have recall laws, but make them fairly hard to use (in particular, a higher bar than just losing at the next election), that's probably the best case scenario. So in principle this policy actually sounds like not too bad an idea.

But for most people who probably don't share my view (either because they haven't put much thought in either way, or because they have and have decided they like recalls), the lack of information here seems tailor-made to make people think "DPP good, KMT bad".

I sent the article to some Taiwanese friends of mine, mostly so they could laugh at the bad journalism, but also so I could get a more local perspective and understanding of what's what. They sent through this article, with the recommendation to Google Translate it.

https://udn.com/news/story/123528/8438406

My take:

． Public officials who have been in office for less than one year "are not allowed to propose or co-sign for removal."

I don't understand what purpose this would have. It does seem undemocratic.

． The number of votes for recall must be higher than the number of votes for election (votes plus one)

Idk how I feel about this one. Assuming a two-stage process where first you have a petition and if the petition reaches a threshold then you hold a proper vote, I kinda like this. It's a pretty neat way to ensure it's always harder to get recalled than to lose an election. But considering the general trend of by-elections and other smaller elections having smaller turn-out than general elections, it seems like it might be too high a burden. Maybe something like a 2/3rd majority requirement for recall, unless the total turnout exceeds the turnout from the general election?

． Public signatures for recall must be accompanied by a copy of their ID card (signatures will be strengthened)

Eeeeek. FUCK NO. Voter ID laws are fucking shit.

That was my initial reaction. My friend did point out though that ID is already required for elections in Taiwan, and that apparently there is an actual history of voter fraud to justify this over there, unlike in, say, Australia or the US. I didn't fact check this though, so I don't know whether it's true or if they've fallen for similar misinformation as is used to try to justify voter ID laws in the anglosphere.

． The prohibition on publishing election polls before polling day is shortened from the first 10 days to the first three days

I'd go the other way. Constant election polling is the worst thing to happen to democracy over the last 2 decades.

So my take away is that I like the goals, and the core of this is more good than bad. But it sounds like it's also being used as an opportunity to introduce some changes that are quite harmful to democracy.

To clarify the "pro-China" stigma (Note that BeiJing-friendly is gentler)

Why Taiwan’s Main Opposition Party Can’t Shake Its Pro-China Stance

By Chieh Yen (January 18, 2023)

Chieh Yen is a research associate at Trust Taiwan, a policy-based NGO in Taiwan. He holds a master’s degree in International Politics from SOAS, University of London.

The Kuomintang (KMT), or Chinese Nationalist Party, despite being the main opposition party in Taiwan and receiving around 38 percent of the popular vote in the 2020 presidential election, is widely regarded as “pro-China.” In an era in which authoritarian regimes are getting more aggressive, the China-friendly label has caused damage to the KMT’s reputation both at home and abroad. KMT leaders are well aware of this issue. Yet, no matter who is the party’s chairperson or presidential candidate, they have failed to get rid of this pro-China stigma. This dynamic has confused observers of East Asian politics, and it requires explanation for a better understanding of cross-strait relations. As with every other political party in the world, a wide spectrum of national identities exist within KMT, and all of them receive different levels of support from party members.

Generally, there are three categories.

The first group, led by chairperson Eric Chu, argues that engaging with the United States while maintaining a good relationship with China will make Taiwan safe. The difference between this KMT faction and President Tsai Ing-wen’s cross-strait policy is that Chu and believe sticking to the “1992 Consensus” is the “key” to communicating with Beijing – regardless of the fact that Chinese leader Xi Jinping has declared that the 1992 Consensus means “both sides of the Taiwan Straits belong to one China and will work together toward national reunification.” This stance on the cross-strait relationship is not acceptable to the bulk of voters from both the KMT and Tsai’s Democratic Progressive Party (DPP). KMT and other pan-Blue voters are of the opinion that Chu’s China policy is too similar to the DPP’s, while pro-Green supporters regard Chu and others as “giving up Taiwan’s sovereignty.” Thus, these leaders have received little support in almost every poll.

The second group in the KMT has a more pro-mainland stance, asserting that the KMT should keep its distance from the United States in order to not frustrate the Chinese Communist Party. They believe that diplomacy, rather than deterrence, is the way to keep the Taiwan Strait safe. To achieve that goal, proponents like former President Ma Ying-jeou insist the Taiwanese government should explicitly state that it agrees with the 1992 Consensus as the foundation for further communications and cooperation. This community within the KMT has more popularity than all the others, as it claims to offer another way to achieve peace, while proclaiming that it can perform better than the DPP in terms of economic welfare since they are capable of establishing better economic ties with China.

The last group within the KMT mainly consists of veterans and their descendants and is the least popular subgroup within the party. After having retreated from the mainland in 1949, this group of KMT members are die-hard supporters of reunification with China, as they still regard China as their home.

Given the “median voter theorem,” we might expect the KMT’s China policy will ultimately shift toward somewhere between the first and the second group. Yet the situation has not unfolded as the theory supposed, due to the structures and mechanisms within the KMT.

After retreating from China, the KMT veteran community established branches of the Huang Fu-hsing, a highly united group that loyally backed the political leaders who came over with them from China. Huang Fu-hsing members still firmly believe that ultimate reunification is the best option. Although their stance on cross-strait affairs is extreme compared to Taiwan’s general public, Huang Fu-hsing branches represent roughly 25 percent of the party member vote, and reportedly have a meticulous mechanism to allocate all their votes to serve various political aims. As a result, the organization became a comparatively strong power within the KMT. No one seeking to win the KMT’s chair position could ignore the voice of Huang Fu-hsing simply due to the fact that no single candidate could take the risk of losing 25 percent of the vote in the primary. If that occurred, a candidate would need more to secure more than two-thirds of the vote in the rest of the supporters to barely win the primary. Tus the Huang Fu-hsing must be courted – and the result is that the KMT’s most extreme voices on cross-strait relations have disproportionate clout within the party. Given this dynamic, the KMT’s leader will always to some extent support the most pro-China opinions.

Unfortunately, this rhetoric will not change because these KMT candidates all need support from the most extreme side within the party. As the opposition party, the KMT will still receive support from those who suffer from the economic hardships caused by COVID-19, but the party has provoked serious concerns both domestically and internationally about whether it will provide a China policy that can satisfy the Taiwanese people and the democratic world.

https://thediplomat.com/2023/01/why-taiwans-main-opposition-party-cant-shake-its-pro-china-stance/

You love to see it..