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Hmm, I wonder why... ๐ค๐คทโโ๏ธ
Unfortunately LineageOS is highly insecure because there's no ability to lock the bootloader, and Android Verified Boot is completely missing. These are just the biggest and most obvious flaws in Lineage, but there are more: https://madaidans-insecurities.github.io/android.html#lineageos
OP apparently needs Chrome to log into an enterprise GSuite account, which has specific requirements, that are enforced by Chrome's enterprise policy system. I don't think this works in Chromium.
It does. You can even try it out yourself. Install Ungoogled Chromium, go to google.com and paste the following code in the Developer console (which you can bring up by pressing F12 and clicking on 'Console' at the top of the DevTools interface):
chrome.runtime.sendMessage(
"nkeimhogjdpnpccoofpliimaahmaaome",
{ method: "cpu.getInfo" },
(response) => {
console.log(JSON.stringify(response, null, 2));
},
);
If it returns nothing or an error, you're good. If it returns something like this:
{
"value": {
"archName": "arm64",
"features": [],
"modelName": "Apple M2 Max",
"numOfProcessors": 12,
"processors": [
{
"usage": {
"idle": 26890137,
"kernel": 5271531,
"total": 42525857,
"user": 10364189
}
}, ...
it means that the hidden extension is present, and *.google.com sites have special access in your browser.
My laptop, that I own and runs Linux that I installed, has chrome in it. Iโm order to log into Gmail for work, it installs an extension that is capable of telling Gmail if my disk is encrypted. I know because you get an error message until my disk was actually encrypted. It was a big surprise to me, and I wonder if this is done by the same piece of code.
That's strange, I've never heard of that before
Btw would there be a way to do virtualization through perhaps docker or flat pack or chroot that can isolate chrome in a sandbox and prevent it from a) reading and writing files anywhere on any disk and b) get other data such as CPU, disk encryption etc?
There are some isolation mechanisms on Linux like Firejail or Bubblewrap. The latter is used by Flatpak to sandbox applications. These are rather weak though, and Flatpak weakens the security of bwrap further. By default, Flatpak application permissions are also set in a Manifest file, which is created by the maintainer of the package. To get more control over your Flatpak sandbox, you need to use an application like Flatseal.
Docker (or containers in general) aren't meant for isolation/sandboxing, but this approach would also work. I would create a container using Distrobox or toolbx, and install Chrome inside the container.
This will not prevent Chrome from getting your CPU information though. To protect against that, you would have to use a virtual machine (and spoof the your CPU model if you want to hide that from Chrome).
That's the way to go
I already ditched Windows for Linux a month ago because of spyware.
Great!
Everything Google-related is next.
Even better.
My phone is going to be the hardest thing to de-infest.
If you plan on getting a new phone soon, I recommend a Google Pixel, on which you can install GrapheneOS. Yes, ironically Google devices are the best for installing alternative operating systems and removing all the Google BS. GrapheneOS is completely free and open source, and based on the Android Open Source Project. It incorporates many privacy and security enhancements, and gives you total freedom and control over your device. In my opinion, it's the best option for degoogling a phone.
Firefox ๐ ๐
Chromium is also affected.
The previous answer is misleading and partially just wrong. Firefox Sync works just fine in LibreWolf, you just need to enable it in the settings. I currently sync my LibreWolf browser on my Linux desktop to Firefox on iOS and Mull on Android, no issues whatsoever. The only Mozilla services that LibreWolf intentionally removes are their telemetry and Pocket.
I fucking hate Google and wouldn't use any of their (proprietary) software, but Pixel phones are amazing. Hear me out, Google is the only phone manufacturer right now, that puts extensive hardware security features like MTE, a secure element, as well as a bunch of others in their phones. The Google Titan M2 is based on an open-source project called OpenTitan, and Google has even contributed their own changes upstream. It's based on the open RISC-V architecture, and it's the most complete and secure implementation of a secure element that you can find in an Android phone. The only thing that comes even close is the "Secure Enclave" in Apple ARM chips, that are used in modern iPhones, iPads and Macs. I understand the concern about a potential backdoor in the firmware, but that's a valid concern with basically every CPU on the market right now. x86 are ARM are completely proprietary, so you can't really trust any CPU based on one of these architectures. The old Google Titan M1 was based on ARM, Apple's Secure Enclave is also based on ARM, as well as Snapdragon's SPU (which is incomplete and insecure anyway). The Titan M2, being based on open hardware architecture and firmware, is the most trustworthy secure element, despite being made by Google. It includes features like Insider Attack Resistance, support for the Weaver API, Android StrongBox hardware keystore implementation and is used for a secure implementation of Android Verified Boot. GrapheneOS is free, open-source, and doesn't use any proprietary Google apps/services by default. Although I hate Google, a Pixel with GrapheneOS is currently the best option for a secure smartphone.