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A human rights monitor documented the sniping of at least 13 children in and around Shifa Hospital, all between the ages of 4 and 16.

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[–] [email protected] 5 points 5 months ago* (last edited 5 months ago)

The amount of projection and denial from you is unreal lol

Most Palestinians Believe Hamas Should Change its Position on Eliminating Israel - WPO March 2, 2006

Most Palestinians agree that Hamas should recognize Israel’s right to exist. Two-thirds (63 percent) of those polled Jan. 27-29 by Near East Consulting said Hamas should change its position calling for the elimination of Israel. Even among those who voted for Hamas, only 37 percent support Hamas’ position that Israel does not have the right to exist.

Apparently the vast majority of Palestinians did not vote for Hamas because of its political goals but because of their desire to rid the Palestinian Authority of corruption, a theme Hamas campaigned on. Among those polled by JMCC who said they voted for Hamas, only 12 percent said they did so because of Hamas’ political agenda. A plurality of 43 percent said they voted for Hamas because they hoped it would end corruption.

Furthermore it should be noted that Hamas did not receive the majority of the popular vote. With the Palestinians’ mixed system of proportional representation according to party support for half the seats and district seats based on population for the other half, Hamas was able to take 58 percent of all seats with only 45 percent of the overall popular vote (the 58 percent includes three independents who campaigned with Hamas).

The Israeli imposed closure on Gaza began in 1991, temporarily, becoming permanent in 1993. The barrier began around Gaza around 1972.

Between July 1971 and February 1972, Sharon enjoyed considerable success. During this time, the entire Strip (apart from the Rafah area) was sealed off by a ring of security fences 53 miles in length, with few entrypoints. Today, their effects live on: there are only three points of entry to Gaza—Erez, Nahal Oz, and Rafah.

Perhaps the most dramatic and painful aspect of Sharon’s campaign was the widening of roads in the refugee camps to facilitate military access. Israel built nearly 200 miles of security roads and destroyed thousands of refugee dwellings as part of the widening process.'* In August 1971, for example, the Israeli army destroyed 7,729 rooms (approximately 2,000 houses) in three vola- tile camps, displacing 15,855 refugees: 7,217 from Jabalya, 4,836 from Shati, and 3,802 from Rafah.

  • Page 105

Through 1993 Israel imposed a one-way system of tariffs and duties on the importation of goods through its borders; leaving Israel for Gaza, however, no tariffs or other regulations applied. Thus, for Israeli exports to Gaza, the Strip was treated as part of Israel; but for Gazan exports to Israel, the Strip was treated as a foreign entity subject to various “non-tariff barriers.”'°° This placed Israel at a distinct advantage for trading and limited Gaza’s access to Israeli and foreign markets. Gazans had no recourse against such policies, being totally unable to protect themselves with tariffs or exchange rate controls. Thus, they had to pay more for highly protected Israeli products than they would if they had some control over their own economy. Such policies deprived the occupied territories of significant customs revenue, estimated at $118-$176 million in 1986.!°! (Arguably, the economic terms of the Gaza—Jericho Agreement modify the situation only slightly.'°)

  • page 240

The Gaza Strip: The Political Economy of De-Development - Third Edition by Sara M. Roy