bellingcat

joined 8 months ago
 

IPFS (InterPlanetary File System) is a decentralized file system that transforms the approach to data storage and transmission on the internet. In this guide, we will show you how to download and save YouTube videos on IPFS in just a few minutes, ensuring their preservation and accessibility.


Key Steps:

  1. Installing IPFS

    • First, you need to install IPFS. Instructions for installation are available on the official IPFS site.
  2. Installing YouTube-dl

    • To download videos from YouTube, we use the youtube-dl utility. Install it using the command:
      sudo apt-get install youtube-dl
      
  3. Downloading Video from YouTube

    • Download the video using youtube-dl:
      youtube-dl <video URL>
      
  4. Adding Video to IPFS

    • After downloading the video, add it to IPFS with the command:
      ipfs add <file name>
      
    • You will receive a hash that will be used to access the video via IPFS.
  5. Accessing Video through IPFS

    • Use the obtained hash to access the video through IPFS:
      https://ipfs.io/ipfs/<file hash>
      

Benefits of Using IPFS:

  • Decentralization: Videos are distributed across network nodes rather than stored on a single server.
  • Security: Content on IPFS cannot be easily deleted or tampered with.
  • Speed: Content loading can be faster by utilizing the nearest network nodes.

Conclusion:

This simple process allows you to easily download videos from YouTube and store them on the decentralized IPFS platform, ensuring content preservation and accessibility.


📹 Youtube On IPFS in 5 mins. SimpleAsWater Tutorial: Building…

In this video, we will show you how to download and save YouTube videos on IPFS in just 5 minutes. Easy and simple with the SimpleAsWater guide.

📹 Read the article on Medium: Youtube On IPFS in 5 mins. SimpleAsWater Tutorial: Building…

📅 Release date: {Release date of the video}

👍 Like and leave comments!

#IPFS #YouTube #Tutorial #Decentralization #SimpleAsWater


I hope this explanation helps you understand the article! If you have any additional questions, feel free to ask.

https://bastyon.com/osint_bellingcat?s=81e8d514277a21be4bda4b3cda5344a4b80c6884292463c876daba539b8a51eb&ref=PLHSBnWJSuzm8qSxvwAtbHZLkLfUA3XZiZ

Here's the introduction to the article with the main idea:


Introduction to the Article:

In this article, we will explore how to effortlessly upload and store YouTube videos on the InterPlanetary File System (IPFS) in just five minutes. IPFS is a decentralized file storage system that offers significant advantages over traditional centralized storage methods. By following a few simple steps, you can ensure the preservation and accessibility of your videos while taking advantage of the security and speed provided by a distributed network.


Key Steps:

  1. Installing IPFS

    • First, you need to install IPFS (InterPlanetary File System). This can be done using the instructions on the official IPFS site.
  2. Installing YouTube-dl

    • This is a tool for downloading videos from YouTube. You can install it with the following command:
      sudo apt-get install youtube-dl
      
  3. Downloading Video from YouTube

    • Download the video using youtube-dl:
      youtube-dl <video URL>
      
  4. Adding Video to IPFS

    • Upload the video to IPFS using the command:
      ipfs add <file name>
      
    • The response will contain a hash, which will be used to access the video via IPFS.
  5. Accessing Video through IPFS

    • Use the obtained hash to access the video via IPFS:
      https://ipfs.io/ipfs/<file hash>
      

Benefits of Using IPFS:

  • Decentralization: Videos are not stored on a single server but distributed across various network nodes.
  • Security: Content on IPFS cannot be easily deleted or tampered with.
  • Speed: Content loading can be faster by using the nearest network nodes.

Conclusion:

This simple process allows you to easily download videos from YouTube and store them on the decentralized IPFS platform, ensuring the preservation and availability of content.


I hope this explanation helps you understand the article! If you have any additional questions, feel free to ask.

https://bastyon.com/osint_bellingcat?s=73c28cfddfbf3bd640a6ac59a9b240feb00f02104950bacf421954a9b2773668&ref=PLHSBnWJSuzm8qSxvwAtbHZLkLfUA3XZiZ

 

Here is the description for your video:


В этом видео мы погружаемся в мир социальной инженерии и методов обмана. Узнайте, как злоумышленники используют психологические приемы для получения конфиденциальной информации и как защититься от таких атак.

👤 Канал: Mladkovsky_D

🔔 Подписывайтесь на канал и нажмите на колокольчик, чтобы не пропустить новые видео!

📹 Видео в 720p: Искусство обмана / Методы социальной инженерии в действии

📅 Дата выхода: {Дата выхода видео}

👍 Ставьте лайк и оставляйте комментарии!

#социальнаяинженерия #обман #защита #кибербезопасность #MladkovskyD


Please replace {Дата выхода видео} with the actual release date of your video.

[–] [email protected] 1 points 6 months ago

Scandal with crypto exchange Beribit: customers besiege the office in "Moscow City" and demand 400 million. Main "Lenta.ru": cryptoinvestors Beribit demand to return them 400 million rubles. They have been besieging the office of the exchange on the 52nd floor of the tower "Federation" in "Moscow City" for the second day to return the funds frozen in their accounts. In total, clients cannot get access to 400 million rubles. What is happening in Beribit - further in the material. As reported "Lenta.ru" with reference to the telegram channel Mash, since the morning of April 26, clients of the exchange Beribit began to gather at the office of the company to return their money. According to them, 400 million rubles were stuck in the accounts of the exchange. Beribit employees tried to escape through the back exit, but they failed. As a result, the company's employees had to talk to disgruntled customers. They were promised to return half of the amount at once, and the remaining debts - within 15 working days. Searches at Beribit At the end of March 2024, Beribit's office in Moscow City was searched against the backdrop of the terrorist attack in Crocus. The company's equipment was seized. The head of Rosfinmonitoring Yuri Chikhanchin said that the organizers of the attack paid the perpetrators, including cryptocurrency. Therefore, checks were held in all offices of crypto exchanges located in "Moscow City". Further here: https://secretmag.ru/zhizn/klienty-beribit-osazhda... Well, the music has been playing for a long time, it seems that the cause and reason for the massacre in Crocus has begun to manifest itself - crypto exchanges are beginning to be clamped down and rumors of a complete ban on cryptocurrencies in the Russian Federation have already started. The article also mentions such nonsense as if by itself - that crypto-investors must be verified and confirm their identity, then maybe they will be paid.

[–] [email protected] 1 points 6 months ago

Crypto exchange Beribit is owned by fugitive Ukrainian oligarch Serhiy Kurchenko. He took control of Beribit in the summer of 2023. Beribit executives are former employees of Energomashbank, which was "finished" by the same Kurchenko.

 

Расширенное руководство по верификации видеоматериалов - Беллингкэт https://ru.bellingcat.com/materialy/putevoditeli/2017/07/18/advanced-video-verification-guide/

Aric Toler13-16 minutes 30.06.2017 One of the most common issues for researchers and journalists is verifying user-generated video content, most often found on social networks and file sharing platforms, such as YouTube, Twitter, Facebook, and so on. There is no silver bullet to verify every video, and it may be nearly impossible to verify some videos short of acquiring the original file from the source. However, there is a range of methods we can use to verify most content, especially as it relates to making sure that videos showing breaking news events are not recycled from previous incidents. There are already numerous guides online for verifying video, most notably in the Verification Handbook. This guide will include some extra quirks frequently used by the Bellingcat team, and make an effort to provide our readers with ways to work around the limitations of the available tools. After reading this guide, hopefully you will not only know how to use this tool set, but also how to use creativity in avoiding dead ends.

Flawed, but still useful: reverse image search The first step in verifying video content is the same as verifying images – run a reverse image search through Google or other services, such as TinEye. Currently, there are no freely available tools that allow you to reverse search an entire video clip the same way we can with image files, but we can do the next best thing by reverse image searching thumbnails and screenshots. People who create fake videos are rarely very creative, and will most often reshare an easy-to-find video without any obvious signs that it does not fit the incident, such as a news chyron or an audio track with someone speaking a language that does not fit the new incident. Because of this, it is relatively easy to fact-check recycled videos.

There are two ways to conduct this search. The first is to manually take screenshots of the video, best either at the very beginning or during key moments in the clip, and then upload them onto a reverse image search service, such as Google Images. The second is to rely on the thumbnails generated by the video host, most often YouTube. There is no easy way to determine which frame a video will automatically select as a thumbnail, as Google developed a complex algorithm for YouTube to select the best thumbnail for an uploaded video (for more on this, see the Google Research Blog entry on the topic here). Perhaps the best tool to find these thumbnails is Amnesty International’s YouTube DataViewer, which generates the thumbnails used by a video on YouTube and allows you to conduct a reverse image search on them in one click.

For example, a YouTube aggregator called Action Tube recently posted a video supposedly showing a convoy of military equipment in Lithuania, but without providing any source material for it. Additionally, there are no indications when the video was filmed, meaning that it could have been from yesterday or five years ago.

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=zX7gu_gS3zE

If we search for this video on the Amnesty International tool, we find out the exact date and time that Action Tube uploaded the video, along with four thumbnails to reverse search to find the original source of the video.

None of the results give us a direct hit on the original source; however, a number of the results on the third thumbnail point to videos that showed this thumbnail on the page at one time. If you click these videos, you may not find this thumbnail, as the results for the “Up next” videos on the right side of a YouTube page are tailored for each user. However, the video with that thumbnail was present at the time when Google saved the results, meaning that you can find this video on the cached page.

Again, none of these five results are the source of the video we are looking for, but when Google cached away its snapshot of the page, the thumbnail video for the source was present on these videos’ pages. When we viewed the cached page for the first result above, we see the source for the video posted by Action Tube, with the title “Enhanced Forward Presence Battle Group Poland Conducts a Road March to Rukla, Lithuania.”

We now have all the information we need to track down the original video and verify that the Action Tube video does indeed show a recent deployment of military equipment in Lithuania. After we search the title of the video found in the thumbnail search result, we find six uploads. If we sort them by date, we can find the oldest upload, which served as the source material for Action Tube.

This leads us to a video uploaded on June 18, 2017 – a day before the Action Tube video, of June 19 – uploaded by “Maj Anthony Clas.” This is the same video shared by Action Tube.

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=_4kHuTs1Nog

If we do a simple search on the uploader, we see that he has written articles for the U.S. Army website about NATO activities in Europe, meaning that he is likely a communications official, thus lending additional credence to his upload being the original source for Action Tube.

Creativity still more powerful than algorithms While reverse image searching can unearth many fake videos, it is not a perfect solution. For example, the video below, which has over 45,000 views, supposedly shows fighting between Ukrainian soldiers and Russian-backed separatist forces near Svitlodarsk in eastern Ukraine. The title translates to “Battle in the area of the Svitlodarsk Bulge in the Donbas (shot from the perspective of the Ukrainian Armed Forces).” We can see a lot of gunfire and artillery shots, while the soldiers seem to be laughing along with the fighting.

When we enter the video’s URL into Amnesty International’s tool, we see the exact date and time it was uploaded, along with thumbnails that we can reverse search.

When looking through the results, almost all of them are for around the same time that the video was uploaded, giving the appearance that the video could genuinely show fighting near Svitlodarsk in December 2016.

However, the video is actually from a Russian military training exercise from 2012.

Even with the most creative uses of reverse Google image search and using Amnesty International’s tool, you will not find this original video in the results, except in articles describing the debunking after the fake videos were spread. For example, if we search the exact title of the original video (“кавказ 2012 учения ночь,” meaning “Kavkaz 2012 night training,” referring to the Kavkaz 2012 military exercises), along with a screenshot from the video, we only find results for the fake Svitlodarsk video. Knowing that this video was fake required one of two things: a familiarity with the original video, or a keen eye (or ear) telling you that the laughing soldier did not correspond with the supposed battle taking place.

So, what is to be done? There is no easy answer, other than searching creatively. One of the best ways to do this is to try thinking like the person who shared a potentially fake video. With the example above, the laughing soldier gives you a clue that perhaps this is not real fighting, leading to a question of under what circumstances a Russian-speaking soldier would be filming this incident and laughing. If you wanted to find a video like this, what would you search for? You would want a video at night probably, so that there would be fewer identifiable details. You would also try looking through footage of spectacular looking fighting, but not something easily recognizable to Ukrainians or Russians following the war in the Donbas — so, finding videos of exercises from the Russian, Ukrainian, or Belarusian army could fit the bill, unless you found war footage from another country and overdubbed it with Russian speakers. If you search the Russian phrases for “training exercises” and “night,” this video would be the very first result. If you were not able to stumble your way to the original video, the best way to verify this video would have been to contact the person who uploaded it.

Be a Digital Sherlock with an eye for detail Using digital tools to verify materials is inherently limited, as algorithms can be fooled. Often, people use simple tricks to avoid detection from reverse image searches – mirroring a video, changing the color scheme to black and white, zooming in or out, and so on. The best way to overcome these factors is an eye for detail so that you can verify individual details in a video to make sure that the surroundings of the video is consistent with the incident at hand.

On September 19, 2016, reports came in that the m an responsible for three bomb explosions in New York City and New Jersey was arrested in Linden, New Jersey. A few photographs and videos emerged from different sources, including the two below showing the suspect, Ahmad Khan Rahami, on the ground surrounded by police officers.

The exact address in Linden, NJ where he was arrested was not clear, but it was a safe bet that these two photographs were real, considering how they showed roughly the same scene from two perspectives. The video embedded below also emerged, from a local citizen. Clearly, the video is real, as it was shared widely on news outlets throughout the day, but how could we have done lightning-fast verification to know it was real in the middle of the breaking news situation?

We can figure out where Rahami was arrested quite quickly from the two photographs. In the bottom-left corner of the second photograph, we can see an advertisement with four numbers (8211), along with fragments of words like “-ARS” and “-ODY.” We can also see that there is a junction for Highway 619 nearby, letting us drill down the location more precisely. If we search for a phone number with 8211 in it in Linden, NJ, we get a result for Fernando’s Auto Sales & Body Work, which completes the “-ARS” and “-ODY” fragments – cars and body. Additionally, we can find the address for Fernando’s as 512 E Elizabeth Ave in Linden, NJ.

Checking the address on Google Street View lets us quickly double check that we’re on the right track.

Left: Photograph of suspect being arrested in Linden, NJ. Right: Google Street View imagery of the same location

In both of the photographs and in the video in question, the weather is the same – overcast and damp. Twenty-six seconds into the video, the driver passes a sign that says “Bower St” and another Highway 619 junction sign, giving us a geographical location to cross-check against the location we found in the two photographs.

A quick glance at Google Maps shows you that Bower Street intersects with East Elizabeth Ave, where the suspect was arrested near the auto repair shop (represented by the yellow star).

If you have time, you can drill down the exact location where the video was filmed by comparing the features on Google Street View to the video.

Left: Video from the day that Rahami was captured in Linden, NJ. Right: Google Street View imagery

While there seems to be a lot of work involved in each of these steps, the entire process should not take much longer than five minutes if you know what to look for. If you do not have access to the eye-witness who provided video materials from the incident, verifying their footage will only require an attentive eye for detail and some legwork on Google Maps and Street View. Verifying video materials should be a routine part of not just reporting, but also in sharing content on social networks, as this is one of the quickest ways that fake news can be spread.

Discerning the signal through the noise Compared to photographs, there is a lot more effort and skill required to digitally alter videos, with the addition or subtraction of elements while still looking natural. Often, videos are altered not just to elude fact checkers, but to avoid the detection of algorithms looking for copyrighted content. For example, movies, television shows, or sporting events may be uploaded to YouTube with the video mirrored, so that it is still watchable (albeit a bit off-putting), but avoid DMCA violations. The best way to quickly detect if a video has been mirrored is to look for any text or numbers, as they will look strange after being flipped.

In the series of screenshots below, 2011 footage of an attack in Moscow’s Domodedovo airport was repurposed to fake videos about the airport attacks in Brussels and Istanbul. Some of the effects that the fakers used include zooming in on segments of the video, adding fake timestamps, and changing the color scheme to black & white. Additionally, gaudy logos are often added on top of the footage, making it even more difficult to reverse image search.

There is no easy way to detect these as fakes through tools, rather you need to rely on common sense and creative searching. Like with the Russian military training video repurposed as fresh battle footage, you need to think what a fake-maker would search for to find source material. Searching the terms “airport explosion” or “CCTV terrorist attack” will give you the Domodedovo airport attack footage, providing a far faster result than playing with screenshots to bring back results in a reverse Google image search.

Likely no silver bullet in sight Many see technological advancements as a future remedy to fake news and content, but it is hard to see any digital methods to out fake videos and verify content with anything close to complete precision. In other words, an arms race between developers and semi-creative fake video creators is a losing battle at this point, barring strict content sharing controls on social networks and YouTube. While the digital tool set is important in verifying fake content, the creative one is even more important.

https://matrix.to/#/!vFghCaGskTTqrJizgo:matrix.org/$GlW8-F9SIyTQ7OiH4jJ_-gM-urnXBF6BUbMx1RHwdT8?via=matrix.org&via=t2bot.io&via=matrix.opulus.space

 

Это оружие стало частью пакета американской помощи в размере 300 млн долларов, который президент Джо Байден одобрил в марте.

В среду вечером о поставках ракет официально заявил представитель Госдепартамента США. «Я могу подтвердить, что Соединенные Штаты предоставили Украине ракеты большой дальности ATACMS по прямому указанию президента», — сказал журналистам Ведант Патель, добавив, что ракеты прибыли в Украину в апреле.

По данным собеседника агентства Reuters, который говорил на условиях анонимности, ракеты были впервые применены рано утром 17 апреля — они были запущены по аэродрому в Джанкое в аннексированном Крыму, расположенному примерно в 165 км от украинской линии фронта.

Источник AP сообщил, что удары также были нанесены по российским войскам на подконтрольной им украинской территории. По сведениям газеты New York Times, речь идет об ударе по российским войскам в оккупированном городе Бердянск в Запорожской области.

В течение 2022-23 годов Киев неоднократно просил США о ракетах ATACMS с максимальной дальностью, однако прошлой осенью получил лишь партию ракет старой модификации MGM-140A с предельной дистанцией стрельбы 165 км.

Однако теперь Байден тайно одобрил поставки ракет MGM-164/168 с дальностью до 300 км, следует из заявлений американских чиновников.

Подробнее читайте здесь (https://www.bbc.com/russian/articles/czq50nypxw1o)

 

In the realm of digital finance and technology, blockchain technology presents new challenges and opportunities on a daily basis. However, behind the innovation lies a hidden side: the risk of crime and fraud in crypto projects. This paper will examine why investigating such crimes is vital.

Case #1: Theft in the millions One of the most widely publicized cases of cryptocurrency theft is the attack on the largest cryptocurrency exchange Mt. Gox in 2014. This attack resulted in the theft of over 850,000 bitcoins, which was worth about $450 million at the time. This incident highlights the importance of securing digital assets and protecting users from loss.

In another case, the "DAO Hack," attackers exploited a vulnerability in the DAO Autonomous Organization (DAO) to steal more than $50 million. This incident demonstrated how vulnerabilities in smart contracts can be exploited to alter the rules of the game in the crypto space. This resource was popular on the dark side of the internet, where illegal trades, including drugs and weapons, were conducted. The investigation of this case emphasized the importance of combating illegal activities and protecting the public from potential threats.

Clarification

Cryptocurrency crime investigations play a crucial role in ensuring security, protecting user interests, and enforcing the law. These cases, while reflecting the darker sides of the cryptosphere, also demonstrate the necessity of continually evolving methods to combat crime in the digital world.

https://matrix.to/#/!vFghCaGskTTqrJizgo:matrix.org/$B-tlr1aBqNvzrSaFBRDqfMFvOkjkWKqxAN5gvp1Tv0o?via=matrix.org&via=t2bot.io&via=matrix.opulus.space

Title: "Unveiling Crypto Crime: Investigating, Securing, and Forecasting"

Annotation: In the realm of digital finance, blockchain technology brings both innovation and risks. This report delves into the importance of investigating crimes in crypto projects, highlighting major incidents and the necessity of evolving security measures.

Keywords: #CryptoCrime #BlockchainSecurity #Investigation #DigitalFinance #Cryptosphere #CyberSecurity #FraudPrevention #CrimePrevention #CryptoProjects #RiskManagement #BlockchainTechnology #SecurityMeasures #DigitalAssets #CryptoFraud #Forecasting #SecurityTrends #CyberCrime #FinancialSecurity #DataProtection #RiskMitigation #DarkWeb

Editorial comment: This report navigates through the intricate landscape of cryptocurrency crime, emphasizing the need for robust investigative measures and proactive security strategies to safeguard digital assets and uphold trust in the blockchain ecosystem.

[–] [email protected] 1 points 7 months ago

Гнилая война. Почему СВО так и не стала народной? - Peer Video Club https://peervideo.club/w/avWoWGmSxTWiRaVXsG5TtB

[–] [email protected] 1 points 7 months ago

Наши авторы - Беллингкэт https://ru.bellingcat.com/contributors/

[–] [email protected] 2 points 7 months ago

Попытать — счастье. Пытки и внесудебные казни в России: от сокрытия и безнаказанности до нормы https://theins.ru/opinions/aleksandr-cherkasov/270487

[–] [email protected] 2 points 7 months ago

Гнилая война. Почему СВО так и не стала народной? - PeerTube (xy-space) https://tube.xy-space.de/w/r9AEXWMcBLwJtGfSvugfeW

[–] [email protected] 1 points 7 months ago

Запрещенные методы ФСБ. Как работают силовики | Надо понимать. Татьяна Фельгенгауэр - PeerTube (xy-space) https://tube.xy-space.de/w/3SxKCXxcrGUhJNPjKpk9tw

 

Fanatics usually act in a state of passion, unprofessionally, and always in one direction. They usually do not leave the area of the terrorist attack, but kill as many people as possible until they are eliminated by security forces. Here we see a planned action: the group arrived, organized and cold-blooded, not in a hurry (this is the key point), shot as many people as possible and also organized and not in a hurry went away by car to a certain point of turnout, where they were already taken.

All this indicates that someone gave them certain guarantees. The first version is based on this. Here it is:

Special services usually supervise and shepherd all radical groups, ultra-left, ultra-right, Islamists, other religious fanatics, etc. These groups are not touched until they cross a certain line marked by the services. This is a big and interesting topic in general, but not about it now. In general, the cell of IS terrorists (or rather their sympathizers) was supervised by one of the FSB contactors. This explains why Western intelligence found out about it: because such chains are usually visible to specialists from the agency. The IS sympathizers, meanwhile, of course don't know it's an FSB officer and are sure it's one of the confidantes. Again, this is a classic theme applied not only in the Russian Federation; this is how all intelligence services operate.

Further, I simplify the scheme as much as possible for clarity: a cell of sympathizers (the IS sends sympathizers, as a rule, not its own members on such tasks) is planning to commit a terrorist act (the reason, for example, is revenge), but expects goodwill from the contactors. The handler, who is connected with Russian agents, gives such permission, adding that the law enforcers will be busy in such squares, far from the theater of the incident, and you have one hour, plus he gives them the location of the conspiratorial turnout.

This scenario explains a lot of things: why they worked in no hurry, organized came and went, realizing that no one would come for their souls, and drove to a certain point, where they were caught. But this scenario has some flaws, which I will not voice, but I will emphasize once again that this is one of the possible scenarios. Then I present the second one, it is simpler, but no less curious.

These Tajiks, who are sympathizers of IS terrorists, were forcibly recruited by the Russian Ministry of Defense for the war against Ukraine, as it has been done for years with migrants: people are forced to sign a contract or lured by deception, saying that you will only dig there/we will give you citizenship and so on. Then, these IS sympathizers, having received basic combat training in Russian camps, simply decide not to go to the front, but to go and shoot people. Such situations have already happened in Russia, when migrants, again Tajiks by the way, also forcibly and fraudulently recruited, shot some soldiers and officers at one of the Russian military bases. This is a similar situation, but this time the types turned out to be a little, so to speak, politically engaged, and decided not to shoot at the base, but to go to kill civilians at once, again, on the tip-off of their handlers (the real ones, the IS).

This second version looks good, but it doesn't explain why they took their time and organized themselves. Again I bring you back to the beginning of my thread: everything points to the fact that they had certain guarantees, and the complete inaction of Russian security forces in the first hour of the attack fully confirms this. Seems key to me.

@yigal_levin

По поводу теракта в Москве вырисовываются две основные версии, основанные, в том числе, и на поведении стрелков. https://casbt1osint.blogspot.com/2024/03/are-two-main-versions-of-terrorist.html?utm_source=pocket_saves



Analysis of the terrorist attack in Moscow: Two Versions.

There are two main versions of the Moscow terrorist attack based, among other things, on the behavior of the shooters. Fanatics usually act in a state of passion, not professionally and always in one direction. They usually do not leave the scene of the attack, but kill as many people as possible until they are eliminated by security. Here we see a planned action: the group arrived, organized themselves, and in cold blood, without rushing (this is the key point), shot as many people as possible, and also organized and without rushing went by car to a certain meeting point, where they were already taken away.

All this suggests that someone provided them with certain guarantees. The first version is based on this. Here it is:

The intelligence services usually control and lead all radical groups, the far left, far right, Islamists, other religious fanatics, etc. These groups are not touched until they cross a certain line marked by the services. This is a big and interesting topic in general, but that's not what we're talking about here. In general, the cell of ISIS terrorists (or rather their supporters) was under the supervision of one of the FSB contractors. This explains why Western intelligence learned about it: because such chains are usually visible to agency specialists. IS sympathizers, meanwhile, of course, do not know that it is an FSB officer and are sure that it is one of their confidants. Again, this is a classic theme that applies not only to the Russian Federation; this is how all intelligence services work.

Next, I've simplified the scheme as much as possible for clarity: a cell of sympathizers (IS sends sympathizers, usually not its own members, on such missions) plans to commit a terrorist attack (the reason, for example, is revenge), but expects goodwill from the contractors. The guardian, who is connected to Russian agents, gives such permission, adding that law enforcement will be busy in such areas, far from the scene, and you.

 

обзор (https://cf2r.org/rta/chars-de-combat-sadapter-au-champ-de-bataille-moderne/) "Французского центра исследований в области разведки" (French Center Recherche Sur Le Renseignement). Ключевые моменты:

  • Танк остается наиболее защищенной машиной на поле боя, обеспечивая экипажу гораздо лучшую выживаемость, чем любая другая бронированная машина.

  • Танк, это по-прежнему грозное гусеничное орудие, с высокой проходимостью и способностью вести мощнейший огонь на 360° в движении.

  • Основные боевые танки (ОБТ) являются наследниками "холодной войны", когда оба лагеря готовились противостоять наплыву танков и бронетехники всех видов в лоб.

  • Компромиссы между защитой, массой, мобильностью и размером силуэта танка породили две основные тенденции:

а) Для танков вроде Leopard 2, M1 Abrams, Challenger 2, Merkava - выбрали очень крепкую броню, а значит - очень тяжелую (>60 т). Это громоздкие машины, с меньшей подвижностью, особенно на мягком грунте. Превосходные орудия и хорошая оптика этих ОБТ рассчитывались, чтобы поразить противника еще до того, как он сможет открыть огонь.

б) Для танков вроде Т-72, Т-80, Т-90 и пр. - основная ставка была сделана на мобильность и компактность, что должна обеспечивать их относительно небольшая масса: от 45 до 55 тонн. Российские танки дешевле и проще в изготовлении, а их автомат заряжания по идее должен был отвечать за более высокую скорострельность, чем у западных.

  • Какие бы компромиссы ни были сделаны по каждой модели танка, цель оставалась прежней: уничтожать танки противника, танковый бой. Однако война в Украине раскрыла/создала другую реальность: менее 5% танков, уничтоженных с начала войны, были подбиты другими танками, остальные пострадали от мин, артиллерии, противотанковых ракет и беспилотников.

  • По словам генерал-майора бундесвера Кристиана Фрейдинга, бои танк-танк стали редкими, а это означает, что относительная сложность этих машин уже не так важна.

  • Подавляющее большинство танкового огня ведется на коротких дистанциях, менее 1000 м, или вообще практически в упор. Для боя в таких условиях качество оптики уже не так важно, за исключением больших пустынных пространств, как на Ближнем Востоке.

  • Из-за дронов современный боевой танк должен противостоять угрозе на 360°. Теперь броня танка должна быть лучше распределена и больше не концентрироваться только в его лобовой части.

  • Новая "прозрачность" поля боя, обеспечиваемая дронами, требует от танка значительно большей мобильности - он должен постоянно маневрировать и скрываться.

  • Симптоматическим лечением недостатков старых танков в новой войне действительно могут выступать защитные клетки и козырьки, а также активная защита, как на "Меркаве", но и она не является панацеей.

  • Россия, похоже, начала оснащать свои танки Т-90М дополнительно системами обнаружения и противодействия, специально приспособленными для обнаружения и уничтожения дронов.

  • При этом мы не можем бесконечно добавлять оборудование, чтобы заполнить новые пробелы, которые появляются с течением времени.

  • Война в Украине уже оказала влияние на разработку будущей версии танка M1A2 Abrams. Отзывы из Украины привели к отказу от эволюции SEPv4, с массой 73+ тонны, в пользу глубоко модифицированной и более легкой и мобильной версии M1E3 (ниже 60 тонн).

"Танк, как таковой - еще не мертв, но вот тяжелый танк уже может быть мертв", - пишут аналитики.

@yigal_levin

 


Карбованець є однією з цікавих криптовалют у сучасному фінансовому світі, а проєкт KARBO привертає увагу своєю унікальністю та особливостями. Ось кілька ключових аспектів криптовалюти та проєкту KARBO:

  1. Децентралізація: Карбованець, як і багато інших криптовалют, ґрунтується на технології блокчейн, що дозволяє здійснювати транзакції без посередництва централізованих організацій.

  2. Анонімність: Основна криптовалюта в мережі KARBO, Карбованець (KRB), відома своєю високою ступенем анонімності та конфіденційності завдяки використанню технології CryptoNote.

  3. Мінімальні комісії: Переказ грошей через мережу KARBO може бути здійснений з мінімальними комісіями, що робить цей проєкт привабливим для міжнародних транзакцій та мікроплатежів.

  4. Спрощена інтеграція: Проєкт KARBO активно працює над тим, щоб забезпечити легку інтеграцію криптовалюти в різноманітні платіжні системи, що робить його привабливим для бізнесів та інших організацій.

  5. Відкритий код: Карбованець має відкритий вихідний код, що сприяє розвитку спільноти розробників та сприяє інноваціям у мережі.

З урахуванням цих особливостей, KARBO може бути привабливим варіантом для тих, хто шукає анонімні та ефективні рішення для фінансових транзакцій. Проте, як і в разі будь-якої криптовалюти, важливо здійснювати обережність та ретельно досліджувати проєкт перед інвестуванням чи використанням.

===================================

#Криптовалюта #KARBO #анонімність #блокчейн #фінанси

===================================

 

A recent revelation by Facebook unveils a network of coordinated misinformation in Ukraine, prompting questions about the integrity of online media and the role of PR agencies. Facebook's action, though significant, raises concerns about the efficacy of internal controls and the broader information landscape in Ukraine.

According to Facebook's cyber security policy head Nathaniel Gleicher, the Kyiv-based company Pragmatico played a central role in promoting pages associated with the "troll factory." Allegedly, Pragmatico spent approximately $1.6 million on Facebook and Instagram ads, amassing over 4 million followers across various pages.

Furthermore, investigations by independent research organizations like DFRLab shed light on the extent of the operation. Analysis of blocked pages revealed ties to media outlets such as Znaj.ua and Politeka.net, suggesting a systematic approach to content dissemination.

DFRLab's findings highlight suspicious patterns in page creation and subscriber acquisition, indicating potential coordination and artificial inflation of engagement metrics. Additionally, discrepancies in public records and testimonies raise questions about the transparency and legitimacy of Pragmatico's operations.

While Znaj.ua and Politeka.net deny accusations of using fake accounts, their coordinated response and similarity in messaging raise doubts about their journalistic integrity. Critics argue that the issue extends beyond freedom of speech, emphasizing violations of Facebook's advertising policies and the exploitation of loopholes for commercial gain.

Oksana Romaniuk from the Institute of Mass Information underscores the need for regulatory intervention to address systemic challenges in the Ukrainian information ecosystem. However, the incident underscores broader concerns about foreign influence and corporate governance in shaping public discourse.

As Ukraine grapples with the aftermath of Facebook's crackdown, the episode underscores the urgency of developing robust mechanisms to safeguard against information manipulation and uphold journalistic standards.

Disclaimer: This report reflects ongoing investigations and presents findings subject to verification. Readers should exercise caution when interpreting the information provided.

Conclusion: The exposure of the "Troll Factory" underscores the vulnerability of online media ecosystems and the need for proactive measures to combat misinformation in Ukraine.

Keywords: Troll factory, Facebook crackdown, misinformation, PR agencies, media integrity, online manipulation

Links:

"Trolls" in the capital Podil, or Whose activity was stopped by the Facebook company bellingcat-osint-casbt.blogspot.com9 min March 27, 2024 View Original On September 16, the Facebook company announced that it had discovered a "troll factory" in Ukraine and deleted the accounts associated with it. Among them were the pages of the Znaj.ua, Politeka and Hyser sites, which position themselves as mass media. However , according to the Institute of Mass Information, which investigates compliance with journalistic standards, they often spread manipulation and false information.

Nathaniel Gleicher, responsible for the cyber security policy at Facebook, writes that the Kyiv company Pragmatico was involved in the promotion of these pages. She spent about $1.6 million on advertising on Facebook and Instagram (or UAH 39.5 million — a considerable amount by Ukrainian standards, - Author), attracting more than 4 million followers.

In addition, according to Gleicher, both pages and groups were managed by fake accounts whose names were constantly changing: "Their owners and administrators posted information about celebrities, show business, sports, local and international news, political and economic issues, including Ukrainian elections, political candidates and criticism of various public figures".

Facebook has released several examples of content shared by these accounts.

A sample of the content posted on some of these pages A sample of the content posted on some of these pages Ukrainian "troll factory": what is known and how did it work?

Specialists of the independent research laboratory of digital forensics DFRLab (a project of the Atlantic Council think tank) conducted their own investigation: on September 16, 2019, Facebook blocked 149 pages for participating in "coordinated inauthentic behavior". DFRLab investigated 121 pages, 64 of which belonged to five media that are part of the Znay Media holding: Znaj.ua, Politeka.net, Akcenty, Hyser, and Clutch.ua. Facebook discovered Znay's connection with PR company Pragmatiko. DFRLab researcher Roman Osadchuk told about this in an exclusive comment to Ukrinform.

Roman Osadchuk Osadchuk : "The page with this name was among the investigated pages. In one of the videos published on the page, a phone number was found that was used in the presentation of another Doping Digital Agency, which in turn claims to own the resources of Know, Politheka, and Clutch. DFRLab established that 37 Znaj.ua and Politeka pages from the entire array were created on December 22, 2018. This is about a third of all analyzed pages. Most of the pages created on this day did not contain publications. Of the 18 Politeka pages created that day, 12 had no publications. From 19 pages Know. UA - 16 did not contain any publication. Analysis in the CrowdTangle tool showed spikes in the number of subscribers around similar dates for the pages of Politeka and Znaj.ua. Thus, the pages of Politeka and Znaj of the city of Kropyvnytskyi, which were registered on December 22, 2018, received more than 600 subscribers in the period from December 30 to January 5. Other key spikes were recorded in late April to early May and late August to early September, when pages received between 30% and 80% increase in followers. Coincidence in dates for two independent pages may indicate possible coordination.”

In addition, Mr. Osadchuk added that the external domains of the Znaj.ua and Politeka.net websites are hosted on the same server and have the same IP addresses.

As for Pragmatico, there is almost no information about this company on the web. The Facebook page and official website are not available. Although such an agency still exists. For example, on the website Work.ua it is stated that the company is engaged in the creation and promotion of personal corporate brands, it employs from 10 to 50 employees.

And the article "PR during the war" is posted on the Politeka website, the author of which is identified as Valery Savchuk, director of the Pragmatico agency. In addition, in one of the resumes on the Jobs.ua website, the job seeker indicated that until August 2019 he worked as a political PR manager in social networks at Pragmatico. The resume says that in this position he was involved in media image formation, creating a positive image and maintaining the customer's reputation in social networks, as well as that he managed a "team of 10 people." But that's not all. LIGA.net journalists managed to talk to a girl who was interviewed at Pragmatico in 2018. According to her, the company was engaged in political PR and promotion of politicians on FB, at that time it had several offices near the Palace of Sport metro station and a large SMM department. The girl provided the contacts of several company managers, but they said: "They have never heard of Pragmatico and have never worked there..."

In turn, Ukrinform took a comment from Odesa blogger Oleksandr Kovalenko , who back in July of this year (at the height of the parliamentary campaign) published a post on his Facebook page mentioning a certain PR company (the blogger did not specify the name, but in a conversation with a journalist did not deny that it was about Pragmatico - see below). According to him, the office of this "office" is allegedly located in the Podol region of the capital.

Oleksandr Kovalenko Oleksandr Kovalenko "The members of the so-called troll groups are young people in their 20s and 30s. They work in three shifts. Each (shift) has 10 people. The monthly salary of one troll is about 9 thousand hryvnias. The norm for a day shift is 300 comments, for a night shift - 200", - says Kovalenko, - At the entrance to the office - there is a security guard who takes phones and other means of photo, video and audio recording from outsiders."

Photo from Oleksandr Kovalenko's post When asked why he mentions Podil in his post, the blogger answered: "Why not? There is a wide selection of office space in any price category, and thanks to a large number of educational institutions, there is easy access to a potential workforce. Shift work allowed even inpatient students to join the work. Of course, I will not name the sources of information. But these people are related to the mentioned company - they worked there."

Somewhat similar to "trolls from Olgino", but no more

According to Oleksandr Kovalenko, this factory did not actually perform any openly anti-Ukrainian tasks. "Strana.UA and their YouTube with an armada of trolls do many times more work to discredit Ukraine than those we are talking about. Basically, this factory worked, let's say, on itself. Political orders to discredit candidates were carried out . Moreover, from completely different persons who radically differ from each other in the vector of their political activity. Of course, like any "troll-generator", it harmed the country's information environment, especially in the midst of an election campaign . But to compare them with the "Holgino trolls"... This would rather be flattery towards them than the truth," the blogger convinces.

It is possible that it is so. However, there is a noticeable "tiny" similarity (underlined and highlighted in bold) with the "trolls" of Yevgeny Prigozhin ("Putin's cook").

At the end of February last year, diplomat, expert of the Russian Research Center Serhii Borshchevskyi wrote in an author's material for Ukrinform entitled "Russian "ichtamnets" on the Internet: the scale is impressive" wrote : "...since the beginning of 2014, employees of the "factory" pretending to be Americans , through social networks spread false information directed against some candidates (...) the "strategic goal" of this company was to introduce destabilizing divisions into the US political system."

The similarity can also be traced in the organizational structure. In the article of the Spanish-language online edition of ABC Internacional (ABC, dated November 20, 2017) entitled "Fake news: the Russian "troll factory" that works "24 hours a day" ( La "granja de trolls" rusos que trabaja las 24 horas del día ), which was translated into Ukrainian by Serhii Borshchevskyi, mentions a boy named Vitaly Bespalov, who came to work as an editor at the St. Petersburg media organization "Internet Research Agency".

ABC Internacional : “The place of work is located in building No. 55 on Savushkin Street in St. Petersburg and is popularly known as the "troll factory." Vitaliy Bespalov became another regular in the production, which functions 24 hours a day (the shift mode was also mentioned by an Odessa blogger) , with a lunch break of 30 minutes... The number of trolls at the "factory", according to various former employees, varies between 400 and 1,000 people placed on different impenetrable (which do not communicate with each other) floors. According to Bespalov, the employees are young people aged 25-30 years (the same age of Pragmatico employees is 20-30 years old) , mostly women."

Znaj.ua and Politeka about blocking on Facebook: "We are not bots or trolls. We are living people"

Meanwhile, the sites Znaj.u aand Politeka.net reject accusations of using fake pages and say that politicians want to limit freedom of speech through the most famous social network.

Znaj.ua : "The entire Znaj.ua team can confirm their identities, have passports and a completely physical, not imaginary, form (...) We insist on restoring the operation of our page. It is very unfortunate to assume that a world-renowned company could become a victim of manipulation by the political forces of Ukraine, which seek to silence well-known media that criticize their activities."

Politeka.net : "The Politeka.net team consists of journalists and programmers, SEO experts and content managers, this is a huge team of people, each of whom can confirm his identity. Prove that he is not a troll or a bot. We, living people, who have been creating news content for the same people — flesh and blood — 24 hours a day for three years now. We're working to restore subscription access to millions of our readers, and to restore our employees to accounts that were once built with great trust and respect for the Facebook team. We believe that the world-famous company will not follow the lead of the political forces of Ukraine, who dream of silencing the well-known media, closing the eyes and ears of readers."

Journalists of " Ukrainian Pravda " analyzed the statements of both sites and found that they are similar in content and form, and individual phrases are formulated almost identically. Yes, both resources wrote that their pages could be deleted due to the fact that "different political groups" were conducting "information wars" there. The sites also admitted that they cooperated with PR agency Pragmatico, with which Facebook linked the seized accounts. However, they say that the company only provided them with "advisory services for promotion in social networks".

The director of the Institute of Mass Information (IMI) Oksana Romaniuk expressed her own opinion in a comment to Ukrinform .

Oksana Romanyuk "Maybe the reason for the blocking is the distribution of fake news by the mentioned sites, assholes... Well, at first I thought so, because the quality of the content on these sites is extremely low. Even the tongue will not return to call it journalism - the standards are constantly violated. But no. News content has nothing to do with blocking. The reason is not freedom of speech, it is something else: the rules of Facebook regarding the distribution of material of a commercial nature - advertising - have been violated. That is, apparently, some technical points. After all, they used so-called "dead" pages - fake accounts - with a huge number of subscribers, but with zero content, - says Mrs. Romaniuk. - It seems that Ukrainian "craftsmen" simply found some loopholes in the social network to engage in aggressive SMM and promote commercial content. At least, that's my opinion. And regarding the fact that the "political forces of Ukraine" are trying, as they write, to force them to "shut up" and the readers to "close their eyes and ears" - no comments here. It is not clear on whose behalf these "official statements" were written. The entire editorial staff of our portal? Well, well... And who goes there, in this editorial office?.."

It remains to be reminded that the problems in the Ukrainian information market are far from exhausted by this story. After all, the blocking of 149 Facebook pages is not only a drop in the ocean, it is also an initiative of a foreign private business that implemented it. Question: when will Ukraine begin to take adequate measures of its own to, at least, limit information diversions due to the "barrier" remain open?

Myroslav Liskovich . Kyiv

https://bastyon.com/steelgrut?ref=PDJ7gBDU1HCrnKW4V5VnuTTZL6ec6BF9Ek

https://bastyon.com/steelgrut?s=c6ec7aa1992672f545267ea62dc733196684c4a5e93e8f7529032fd8dae9bb80&ref=PDJ7gBDU1HCrnKW4V5VnuTTZL6ec6BF9Ek

https://bastyon.com/steelgrut?s=cb5905cf21b9916b491c6b93e108f4ea79bb2fcd70cb25651342e4b675ebecab&ref=PDJ7gBDU1HCrnKW4V5VnuTTZL6ec6BF9Ek

 

THIS MATERIAL (INFORMATION) IS PRODUCED AND DISTRIBUTED BY THE BELL FOREIGN AGENT OR RELATES TO THE ACTIVITIES OF THE BELL FOREIGN AGENT. 18+

In November 2023, Aras Agalarov's Crocus Group pledged Crocus City Hall, RBC found out (https://www.rbc.ru/finances/27/03/2024/66031a4d9a7947d7aeb464ff). The building was to be pledged to Gazprombank until the end of 2032.

After the fire, Crocus retained about 20-30% of its original value at the expense of land and surviving structures, according to independent analyst Andrei Barkhota. However, Gazprombank may now require Agalarov to provide additional collateral for the loan or transfer the loan to a lower quality category with additional provisions.

Lawyers also note that banks require clients to insure the collateral "in virtually 100% of cases." However, whether the insurance will cover the realized risk is a "most interesting" question

Gazprombank Pledges Crocus City Hall: Financial Implications

Amidst the aftermath of the Crocus City Hall fire, RBC's investigation reveals a significant financial development: in November 2023, Aras Agalarov's Crocus Group pledged Crocus City Hall to Gazprombank until 2032. This move raises questions about the financial stability of both parties involved.

Independent analyst Andrei Barkhota suggests that despite the fire, Crocus retains a fraction of its original value, mainly due to the value of the land and surviving structures. However, Gazprombank may now demand additional collateral or downgrade the loan's quality category, potentially leading to increased provisions.

Moreover, legal experts highlight the standard requirement for banks to insure collateral. However, the extent to which insurance coverage will mitigate realized risks remains uncertain, adding complexity to the financial situation.

Disclaimer: This investigation presents preliminary findings subject to verification. Readers should interpret the information with caution, considering potential biases and the evolving nature of the situation.

Conclusion: The pledge of Crocus City Hall to Gazprombank underscores the intricate financial dynamics at play post-fire. As stakeholders navigate these challenges, the implications for both parties' financial stability remain uncertain.

Keywords: Crocus City Hall, Gazprombank, financial pledge, fire aftermath, collateral, insurance coverage

Links:

OSINT Military Community / X https://twitter.com/i/communities/1583435558805803016

 

The resignations of the heads of the FSB, Ministry of Internal Affairs and other agencies after a terrible terrorist attack? Who will dismiss them, if they already have other plans! With such an inactive security system, they will most likely be rewarded for detaining these Tajiks from ISIS, who, by the way, probably just happened to get into this story.

As for the terrorists themselves, the difference between execution and life imprisonment for society is really minimal. After all, basically, our society only wants to show its civility, right? So perhaps the death penalty was meant for other categories of "citizens" such as "traitors and traitors".

Meanwhile, while ordinary Russians are being sent to Ukraine for slaughter en masse, Gazprom decided to keep up and increased the remuneration of its top management by as much as 48%! Yes, what a wonderful contribution to public welfare.

The ChatGPT neural network gave its exclusive opinion on the question "When will Russia be good?": "It's already been good." Yeah, sure, why wouldn't it be, right?

And what's up with all those security forces? 4.5 million trained and equipped people, and still locksmith Vasya from the village of Kukuyevo must go to fight with "fascists". And why do we need so many law enforcers if they are going to sit on the taxpayers' necks?

Finally, if the video of the terrorist attack in Crocus doesn't show the fire alarm system working, it just means that it wasn't working, right? I'm sure the treasury thieves' security guarantor will find some clever excuse for that.

And yes, the detained car mechanics and car wash workers are, of course, already happily cooperating with the investigation. After all, we have such honest citizens here in Russia!

 

cross-posted from: https://lemmy.world/post/13452327

  • Gunmen stormed a concert hall in Moscow on Friday, killing at least 60 people and injuring more than 100.
  • Earlier this month, the US embassy issued a security alert warning of a potential terror attack.
  • Just days ago, Vladimir Putin dismissed the idea as "blackmail" from the West.

Earlier this month, the US embassy in Russia issued a security alert warning about a potential terror attack in Moscow and urged people to avoid crowds, monitor local media for updates, and be aware of surroundings.

"The Embassy is monitoring reports that extremists have imminent plans to target large gatherings in Moscow, to include concerts, and U.S. citizens should be advised to avoid large gatherings over the next 48 hours," the March 7 security alert said.

Putin addressed the warnings a couple weeks later, criticizing the warning three days ago as "provocative."

"All this resembles outright blackmail and the intention to intimidate and destabilize our society," Putin said, according to state media reporting on his remarks.

The US embassy issued another alert on Friday saying it was "aware" of the attack and urged Americans to avoid the area.

[–] [email protected] 1 points 7 months ago

#VideoEyeliner

Title: Unveiling the Bellingcat & Co Investigation: Decoding the Crocus City Hall Incident

Annotation: This investigative report delves into the findings of the Bellingcat & Co investigation regarding the terrorist attack at Crocus City Hall. It scrutinizes the sequence of events, discrepancies in official narratives, and implications of the incident.

Editorial Comment: The Bellingcat & Co investigation sheds light on critical aspects of the Crocus City Hall incident, raising questions about the transparency of official accounts and the effectiveness of security measures.

Disclaimer: This investigation was conducted urgently and requires thorough verification. All information provided should be treated as speculative and subject to bias. Readers are urged to approach the content critically and verify independently.

Conclusion: The Bellingcat & Co investigation presents compelling evidence challenging the official narrative surrounding the Crocus City Hall incident. It underscores the need for transparency and accountability in addressing security lapses and responding to acts of terrorism.

Keywords: Bellingcat, Investigation, Crocus City Hall, Terrorism, Security Lapses

Links:

Hashtags: #Bellingcat #Investigation #CrocusCityHall #Terrorism #SecurityAnalysis #LeoFinance #WarInUkraine #TeamUkraine

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#Moscow #Crocus #City #Hall

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