The Cradle: 60 days of uncertainty: Can the Israel–Hezbollah ceasefire hold out?
In the early hours of 27 November, the shaky ceasefire agreement between Israel and Hezbollah, brokered by the US and France, with widespread international and regional support, came into effect. The fragile truce was immediately met with skepticism by many Israelis – officials and civilians – who doubted their country’s ability to follow through.
Some officials openly labeled the deal a defeat against Hezbollah and placed the blame squarely on Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu for failing to achieve both the stated and hidden objectives of his war on Lebanon – particularly the goals of eliminating the resistance movement and returning hundreds of thousands of displaced settlers back to the north. A poll conducted by Israel's Channel 12 revealed that over 80 percent of Netanyahu’s support base opposed the ceasefire. Residents in northern Israel, many of whom were evacuated due to Hezbollah's strikes, also expressed outrage. Domestically, Israel was deeply divided over the agreement, with polls showing 37 percent supporting the ceasefire and 32 percent opposing it.
False sense of victory
The shock among Israeli elites following the prime minister's endorsement of the truce agreement was due to a false sense of victory. Netanyahu, along with former Defense Minister Yoav Gallant, had misled them into believing that the Israeli military had destroyed 80 percent of Hezbollah’s missile capabilities, giving the impression that the Lebanese resistance movement was on the brink of collapse. Israelis watched in humiliation as Hezbollah prevented five enemy divisions from advancing more than three to five kilometers into Lebanese territory – an advance that was, anyway, tactically insignificant, as the divisions should have penetrated 20 kilometers deep.
Strategically, Hezbollah continued to target Israeli military assets well beyond the border, reaching as far as the Ashdod naval base, 150 kilometers inside Israel, and maintaining blistering attacks on key cities like Haifa and Tel Aviv. These strikes severely disrupted daily life inside the most populated centers of the occupation state, paralyzing military operations and showing Israel that eliminating Hezbollah was not a feasible war goal. Hezbollah’s missiles even reached Tel Aviv, reinforcing a "Beirut–Tel Aviv" deterrence equation. Netanyahu ultimately conceded that diplomacy was his only viable solution, particularly given the growing issues within the occupation military itself: exhaustion, injuries, munitions shortages, and limited progress.
Israel’s 60-day strategy
The unease within Israel over this agreement has led Netanyahu and new Defense Minister Israel Katz to direct the army to develop a new strategy within the next 60 days, a period stipulated in the agreement for Israel’s full withdrawal from Lebanese territory. This strategy involves two main actions: first, conducting targeted airstrikes on Hezbollah positions both inside and beyond the area south of the Litani River, and second, preventing Lebanese residents from returning to villages and towns within a 10-kilometer range of the border.
The airstrike directive is meant to reaffirm Israel's military freedom of action, in part to assure the Israeli public that occupation forces retain their ability to strike Hezbollah when necessary. This controversial clause, which Lebanon completely rejected, was part of private, unseen US guarantees to Tel Aviv, given without Beirut's consent. Netanyahu aims to portray Israel as having accepted the agreement from a position of strength while buying time until the five-member Monitoring Committee begins its work on addressing ceasefire violations. During the next 60 days, the presence of occupation forces in Lebanon will keep tensions high, requiring close monitoring of Hezbollah to ensure the security of these troops until their full withdrawal.
The decision to prevent Lebanese residents of border areas from returning to their homes aims to avoid an awkward contrast between the resettlement of southern Lebanese residents while the displacement of northern Israelis continues. Those optics would be politically damaging for the Israeli government.
Managing withdrawal and maintaining strength
In essence, the Israeli military’s strategy over the coming 60 days revolves around maintaining a veneer of strength and managing the delicate withdrawal process, which will conclude with the Lebanese army, in coordination with UNIFIL, taking full control of the region’s security. Afterward, the Monitoring Committee will enforce compliance with UN Resolution 1701, which prohibits Israeli military actions within Lebanon. This was confirmed by Hezbollah Secretary General Sheikh Naim Qassem in his last speech when he announced his commitment to the agreement and that coordination with the Lebanese army would be at the highest level.
If Israel insists on continuing to violate the agreement based on US guarantees that Lebanon has neither seen nor accepted – and continues to launch attacks under the oversight of the Monitoring Committee and its American chair, it could provoke a reciprocal response from Lebanon and possibly lead to a resumption of hostilities. Hezbollah has already fired a warning shot on 2 December, targeting Israeli-occupied Lebanese territory. This comes after Israel has violated the ceasefire dozens of times since it went into effect seven days ago. Tel Aviv responded disproportionately to the single Hezbollah retaliation, striking a number of sites across Lebanon. CNN itself admits, citing a UN peacekeeping source, to over 100 violations as of 3 December.
But both Israel and Lebanon need this agreement: their two-month military confrontation underscored that a continued war would only lead to further exhaustion and unsustainable losses on both sides. The ceasefire also came about due to international pressure, particularly from the US – a principal mediator – which sought to end a conflict that had become an embarrassment due to Israel’s disregard for international law and civilian lives. Despite ongoing violations, including artillery shelling, air raids, and drone activity, the agreement appears poised to stabilize the situation due to mutual necessity. For Israel, continued conflict would only lead to greater attrition, while Lebanon benefits from halting aggression and ensuring stability along the border.
Given these circumstances, it seems likely that the agreement will hold, benefiting all parties. Any violations should be addressed by the Monitoring Committee, which will aim to restore stability along the border, especially after the 60-day period and the full deployment of the Lebanese army.
So I have concluded:
Israel has achieved its goal of detaching the Gaza and Lebanon fronts from each other. Nasrallah's doctrine is broken.
The "ceasefire" isn't a ceasefire; it's a continuation of Israeli policy to try and ethnically cleanse South Lebanon but with less Hezbollah resistance to the plan. Israel's bombings have not stopped. Nonetheless, both Lebanon and Hezbollah seem desperate for the ceasefire to hold, allowing many dozens of Israeli violations and continued bombing. This indicates that damage to Hezbollah and/or internal stability has been more substantial than I previously anticipated.
Israel has failed to achieve its goal of destroying Hezbollah and Hamas. It was forced to sign a ceasefire to prevent further attrition and is now going after Syria instead, as it is weaker than Hezbollah.
Israel probably intends to use the 60 day window to try and destroy Syria to disrupt Resistance supply lines. Israel will probably invade Syria from the Golan Heights at a pre-determined point to trap Damascus in a two-front battle and end Assad's government. If this fails due to Iraqi and Iranian involvement, then Israel may not restart the war with Hezbollah. If it succeeds and Assad is removed from power and HTS takes power (or there's a power vacuum), then Israel may try and go for Hezbollah once again.
Lebanon's official army will likely not be strong enough to stop an advance by Israel to the Litani River. If Hezbollah is intelligent, they will not meaningfully withdraw past the Litani until at least after the 60-day window. Ideally they'll never withdraw and keep substantial underground elements there. It would be quite possibly one of the worst military decisions in all of human history for Hezbollah to obey the command and evacuate its tunnels and soldiers in the coming days and weeks. If they do this, it means that Hezbollah has essentially been defeated in its stated objectives (protect South Lebanon and help Palestine; the second point is now fractured), without Israel even needing to endure Hezbollah's feared missile barrages, and Israel will likely succeed - at least temporarily - in annexing South Lebanon in the near future, as well as whatever they potentially grab in Syria. Hezbollah's continued existence is questionable if they have no reason to exist.
The ball is now in Iran's court. If they fumble the situation and are unwilling to counter the escalation with another escalation, it is possible that their regional allies will be systematically destroyed by bombing campaigns over the coming months and years. On the other hand, if Syria can be stabilized and Hezbollah kept resupplied by manpower and materiel, and they don't do anything stupid like withdrawing from South Lebanon, then Israel will have failed in its objectives and Zionism as a settler ideology will have been critically damaged. It is possible that the Lebanon and Gaza fronts could be reconnected under these conditions if Israel is even then unwilling to end the genocide and withdraw from Gaza, but given Hezbollah's general willingness to put up with Israeli bombings (aside from the occasional warning shot), it's equally possible that they will be unwilling to step up to help Palestine anymore as the damage may have been too great.